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Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special Form of
Collusion in Class Action Settlements
William D. Henderson*
A clear sailing agreement (or clause) is a compromise in which a class action defendant
agrees not to contest the class lawyerk petition for attorneys' fees. This Article argues that a
clear sailing provision is often used to facilitate collusive settlements in cases involving
nonpecuniary relief or common funds in which a defendant retains a reversionary interest.
Because these types of settlements present difficult valuation problems, trial courts lack a clear
benchmark for calculathig attorneys'fees. Thus the defendants and the lawyer for the class can
exploit this uncertainty by presenting an inflated settlement value to the court (to justilf higher
attorneys'fees) while simultaneously reducing the true cost to the defendant Although courts
purportedly apply "heightened scrutiny" to settlements involving clear sailing agreements, this
approach rarely thmeatens the underlying settlement As a result, clear sailing agreements tend to
undermine the deteirence liuction of class action lawsuits by producing settlements that are
systematically too low This Article proposes a per se ban on settlements that rely upon clear
sailing provisions. In addition, this Article recommends the appointment ofa guardian ad litem
to litigate the issue ofattorneys'fees in all cases involving nonpecuniary reliefor a claims-made
reverter fund.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, class action settlements have increasingly relied
on clear sailing agreements to resolve the issue of attorneys' fees.' A
clear sailing agreement (or clause) is a compromise in which the
defendant agrees not to contest the amount awarded by the court
presiding over the settlement as long as the award falls beneath a
negotiated ceiling.' One of the main criticisms of clear sailing
provisions is that they represent prima facie evidence of simultaneous
negotiations of merit relief and fees, which is a practice fraught with
1. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinkng Damages in Secuties ClassActions, 48
STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1534 (1996) (noting that most class action settlements "typically
include[ ] a 'clear sailing' clause" to address attorneys' fees).
2. Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F2d 518, 520 n. 1(1st Cir. 1991); see
also Waters v. Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 1999)
(reviewing a class action settlement where the plaintiff's counsel agreed that his fee petition
would not exceed thirty-three and one third percent of the settlement fund and, per the terms
of the clear sailing agreement, the defendant "will not directly or indirectly oppose Plaintiff's
Class Counsel of Record's application for fees and expenses or compensation of the
Representative Plaintiffs"); Alexander, supm note 1, at 1534 (stating that under a clear sailing
clause, "the defendants agree not to oppose an attorneys' fee request of up to a specified
amount").
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serious ethical concerns for lawyers representing the class. Both
courts and commentators have expressed apprehension that a
plaintiff's counsel may be accepting a lower settlement for the class in
exchange for a generous and nonadversarial treatment of fees.? The
prevailing response among the courts has been to subject such
settlements to "heightened scrutiny," which occasionally results in an
award of attorneys' fees that is lower than the ceiling amount specified
in the clear sailing agreement.'
This Article argues that the heightened-scrutiny approach serves
as an ineffective deterrent to collusive settlements in which the
plaintiff's counsel, under the guise of a clear sailing agreement, has
settled for a smaller class award in exchange for preferential treatment
on fees. Because judicial approval of these types of settlements takes
place without the benefit of adversarial proceedings,' the heightened-
scrutiny approach exaggerates the ability of courts to detect
impermissible trade-offs. Moreover, collusive parties can respond to
3. See, e.g., Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 908 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (arguing that a clear sailing clause "creates the likelihood that plaintiffs' counsel,
in obtaining the defendant's agreement not to challenge a fee request within a stated ceiling,
will bargain away something of value to the plaintiff class" and suggesting that "[p]erhaps
they should be forbidden in all cases"), abrogated on other grounds by Amchem Prods. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Alexander, supra note 1, at 1535 (proposing that courts
entertain fee requests only after a settlement has been approved by the court, thus eliminating
the need for clear sailing clauses, as "[s]uch clauses have obvious potential to encourage
collusive settlements"); Melvin R. Goldman & George Aguilar, Recent Developments in
Attorney Fee Negotiation During the Settlement of Derivative and Class Action Suits, in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES: LITIGATING ANTITRUST,
CIvIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SECURITIES CASES 199, 206 (1987) (noting that "the
'clear sailing' clause lends a air of collusion that may be harmful to the settlement of the
merits").
4. See infm Part II.D.
5. SeeMalchman, 761 F.2d at 907-08 (Newman, J., concurring) (arguing that a clear
sailing clause "deprives the trial court and a reviewing court of the certainty of having the
propriety of the fee request tested in the adversary process" and noting that objectors cannot
always be relied upon to fill this void). At present, there is no consistent rule that a notice for
settlement containing a clear sailing agreement must include information on compensation
that will be paid directly to class counsel; obviously, this information may be important to
elicit effective objectors. Cf In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 803 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that failure of the notice to apprise class
members of the substantial cash payment to the plaintiff's counsel when class relief was
limited to coupons for the purchase of a new truck was strongly suggestive of a conflict of
interest). Fortunately, the Supreme Court recently approved an amendment to Rule 23 that
will require parties to "file a statement identifying any agreement made in connection with"
any proposed settlement. US. Supreme Court Endorses Package of Federal Rule
Amendments, 71 U.S.L.W 2615, 2615 (Apr. 1, 2003) (quoting proposed Rule 23(e)(2)).
Unless Congress alters the proposed rule, the amended version of Rule 23 will take effect on
December 1, 2003. See id, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/congress0303/CV-
Letters.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
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the heightened-scrutiny approach by moderately inflating the ceiling
amount for attorneys' fees in anticipation of a downward adjustment
by the court.
This Article further argues that the heightened-scrutiny approach
imposes a disincentive on only one collusive party, the plaintiff's
attorney. Insofar as acquiescence on the issue of fees results in a lower
settlement than would be possible if the plaintiff's counsel focused
exclusively on relief for the class, defendants are likely to be the most
consistent beneficiary of clear sailing agreements. The heightened-
scrutiny approach is therefore problematic from a social perspective
because it undercuts the deterrence function of the class action device
and could lead to higher levels of wrongful or illegal conduct by
defendants.'
Finally, close examination of the case law reveals that clear
sailing agreements are especially prevalent in settlements involving
either nonpecuniary relief or a claims-made common fund where the
defendant retains a reversionary interest.! Because these cases
represent extremely difficult valuation problems that do not exist in a
typical common-fund case, courts should respond by adopting
procedural safeguards that are specifically designed to protect the
interests of the class. Notwithstanding the favorable view toward class
action settlements that exists within the federal judiciary,' this Article
proposes that the most effective mechanism for minimizing collusive
negotiations and preserving the deterrence function of class actions is
for courts to adopt a per se rule that rejects all settlements that include
clear sailing provisions. Such a rule would encourage plaintiff's
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 626-27 (5th ed. 1998)
(arguing that "the most important point [of a class action] from an economic standpoint is
that the violator be confronted with the costs of his violation-this achieves the allocative
purpose of the suit-not that he pays them to his victims"); see also infma Part III.B.
7. Seenfr Part l.B.
8. See, e.g., Linney v. Cellular Alaska P'ship, 151 E3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating that "very limited" review of a district court's decision to certify a class action
settlement is supported by a "strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where
complex class action litigation is concerned" (quoting Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 E2d
1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992)); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 55 E3d at 784 (noting that "the law
favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other complex cases where substantial
judicial resources can be conserved by avoiding formal litigation"); In re U.S. Oil & Gas
Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 493 (1lth Cir. 1992) (noting that "[p]ublic policy strongly favors the
pretrial settlement of class actions lawsuits"); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 E2d 61, 73 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("There are weighty justifications, such as the reduction of litigation and related
expenses, for the general policy favoring the settlement of litigation .... "); Cotton v. Hinton,
559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging "an overriding public interest in favor of
settlement" of class actions).
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counsel to focus solely on the benefit to the class. After the
defendant's total liability has been fixed through the settlement
process, plaintiff's counsel can then petition the court for fees under
the equitable common-fund doctrine.! Because the common-fund
doctrine places the plaintiff's counsel in a position that is directly
adverse to the class, a court can use its supervisory authority under
Rule 23 to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the class on the
issue of attorneys' fees.'" A plaintiffs counsel that has diligently
represented the interests of the class in the settlement process should
be able to marshal sufficient evidence to justify a relatively high fee
award under either the percentage of the common fund or the lodestar
with multiplier method of calculating attorneys' fees."
Part II of this Article surveys the case law that has addressed the
issue of clear sailing agreements, including the emergence of the
heightened-scrutiny approach. Part III argues that settlements that
include a clear sailing agreement are likely to impose a less than
optimal level of liability on defendants while, on average, rewarding
class counsel for trading merit relief for higher fees. Finally, Part IV
recommends that courts adopt a per se rule against settlements that
include a clear sailing provision. It also details how this approach
would be implemented in cases involving nonpecuniary relief or a
9. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939) (holding that
"historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts" permits an award of attorneys' fees out of a
common settlement fund that benefits all members of the class); Skelton v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 860 E2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that "when a case results in the creation of a
common fund for the benefit of a plaintiff class, a court will exercise its equitable powers to
award plaintiffs' attorneys' fees out of the fund"); Court Awarded Attorney Fees: Report of
the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 ER.D. 237, 250-52 (1985) [hereinafter Third Circuit
Report] (acknowledging the policy against unjust enrichment that underlies the common-
fund doctrine).
10. District courts have occasionally used this mechanism in traditional common-
fund cases. See, e g., Meyer v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 117 ER.D. 180, 183 n.3 (M.D. Ga.
1987) (noting that the guardian adlitem appointed by the court to represent the class will be
paid out of the settlement fund at the conclusion of the case); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank,
77 ER.D. 382, 383 (WD. Pa. 1977) (asserting that a judge cannot adequately represent the
class on the issue of fees while also maintaining "his acknowledged duty to act as an
impartial arbitrator" and "[t]he appointment of a guardian for the class obviates this
considerable problem ofjudicial schizophrenia"); Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 70 ER.D. 533,
535 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (noting that "the interest of the class members is specifically adverse to
the interest of their lawyers who seek an attorney's fee .. . from the settlement fund" and that
"this procedure both achieves protection for the members of the class and enables the trial
judge to remain in an impartial position" and stating that authority to appoint a guardian ad
litem "is inherent within Rule 23(d)").
11. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992) (observing that
lodestar multipliers and percentage models are similar to contingency arrangements where
the lawyer adjusts his fee to cover the risk of nonpayment).
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reversionary interest, 2 including the process for determining attorneys'
fees.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO CLEAR SALING AGREEMENTS
From a legal-doctrine perspective, clear sailing agreements are
problematic because they are perceived as a form of simultaneous
negotiations of attorneys' fees and merit relief. This Part examines the
judicial response to simultaneous negotiations as it has evolved during
the last twenty-five years. Subpart A discusses the emergence of the
Prandini rule in the mid-1970s," which barred the approval of class
action settlements that were a product of simultaneous negotiations.
Subpart B examines the type of class action settlements that have most
frequently included clear sailing agreements. Subpart C considers
Malchman v Davis,4 which was the first appellate case to squarely
address the use of clear sailing agreements in class action settlements
and resulted in a split-panel decision with three divergent approaches
to clear sailing agreements. Finally, subpart D summarizes the
subsequent development of the heightened-scrutiny approach, which
often includes a downward adjustment in attorneys' fees but rarely
threatens the settlement itself.
A. The Prandini Rule and the Ban on Simultaneous Negotiations
In 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
became the first federal appellate court to address the propriety of
simultaneous negotiations in the class action setting. In Prandini v
National Tea Co., attorneys sought approval of a class action
settlement involving charges of sexual discrimination against a private
12. For a useful overview of these more complicated forms of class actions
settlements, including a taxonomy of cases into five discrete categories of nontraditional
damages relief, see Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action
Settlements, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 97, 101-07.
13. See Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co. 557 F2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding, in a
case involving a clear sailing agreement, that the trial court must approve class relief before
permitting parties to negotiate the issue of attorneys' fees).
14. 761 F.2d 893, 906 (2d Cir. 1985) (approving class action settlement despite
presence of clear sailing agreement).
15. The Prandinirule was foreshadowed by an earlier district court decision, Jamison
v Butcher & Sherred, 68 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1975), which rejected a proposed
settlement as inadequate and "disapproved generally of settlements containing agreements on
fees." See also Third Circuit Report, supra note 9, at 267 (discussing first cases dealing with
simultaneous negotiations of merit relief and attorneys' fees in a class action context).
8 18 [Vol. 77:813
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employer. 6 The agreement included $97,000 in class relief, a $15,000
payment to the representative plaintiff, and a clear sailing provision in
which the defendant agreed not to contest any request for attorneys'
fees at or below the $50,000 ceiling amount." The district court
approved the relief for the class but had a separate hearing to address
the issue of attorneys' fees.'" The amount eventually awarded reflected
a downward adjustment from the initial fee petition." On appeal, the
Third Circuit vacated the lower court order and proposed the general
rule that a trial court presiding over a class action should insist upon a
settlement on damage relief before permitting parties to negotiate the
issue of fees.20
Although commentators viewed the Pran&ni rule as a laudable
attempt to deal with a serious structural problem in class action
settlements,2' strict adherence to the decision ultimately proved
impractical. The primary criticism levied against Prandini was that it
tended to discourage settlements by limiting the ability of a defendant
to ascertain the full extent of its liability.22 However, in 1986, shortly
16. Pandin 557 F.2d at 1017-18. Rule 23 requires court approval of all class action
settlements. See FED. R. Civ P. 23(e) (2000) (stating that a "class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court").
17. Prandin, 557 F.2d at 1018 (commenting that the defendant "had agreed to pay a
sum up to $50,000 if approved by the court, [and therefore] it did not contest the fee award in
the district court. In the interest of consistency, the [defendant] ... has not participated in the
appeal"). Although it may be obvious to the reader, it is hard to construe the $15,000
payment to the named plaintiff as anything but a thinly veiled bribe to abandon the interests
of the class.
18. Id. at 1017-18.
19. Id at 1018, 1020-21 (noting the district court's skepticism of "a sweetheart
contract").
20. Id at 1021 (holding that "[o]nly after court approval of the damage settlement
should discussion and negotiation of appropriate compensation for the attorneys begin").
21. See, e.g., Third Circuit Report, supa note 9, at 268 (discussing general approval
among commentators); John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiffas Monitor
in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 71 & n.207
(citing Prandini as an example of a "prophylactic rule" that forbids adversaries from
negotiating the fee award until after the settlement has been judicially approved and
discussing how the rule reduces potential for collusion); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts
in ClassActions, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1207-09 & n. 100 (1982) (noting how Prandin's ban
on simultaneous negotiations eliminates even the appearance that a plaintiff's counsel
"recoup[ed] his own investment at his clients' expense").
22. See, e.g., Third Circuit Report, supra note 9, at 266-70 (discussing
discouragement of settlement problem arising from Prandini and concluding "that its
difficulties exceed its benefits"); ARTHUR R. MILLER, ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS: A
REPORT TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 223-24 (1980) (discussing likely negative effects
of Prandini on settlement); Comment, Settlement Offers Conditioned upon Waiver of
Attorneys'Fees. Policy Legal, and Ethical Considerations, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 804-05
(1983) (describing adverse settlement incentives that arise from the Prandinirule).
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after a task force was convened in the Third Circuit to examine the
issue of court-awarded attorneys' fees, the United States Supreme
Court ruled in Evans v JeffD that the language of the federal civil
rights fee-shifting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, did not preclude
simultaneous negotiations when the parties determined that such a
discussion would be conducive to settlement.23 According to the
Court, an absolute ban would be highly counterproductive, "forcing
more cases to trial, unnecessarily burdening the judicial system, and
disserving civil rights litigants."24 Therefore, at least in cases which
potentially implicate § 1988, the Prandi rule has been expressly
overruled.25
B. Sunutaneous Negotiations and the Common Fund
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Evans, federal appellate
courts have continued to struggle with the issue of simultaneous
negotiations in traditional class action cases where an attorney's right
to payment is based upon a common benefit he has conferred upon the
class. However, a careful review of the case law suggests that
simultaneous negotiations in the form of a clear sailing agreement are
least problematic in typical common-fund cases. This assertion is
based on the fact that a defendant who has settled a class action lawsuit
is ultimately indifferent to how a single lump-sum payment is
apportioned between the plaintiff's attorney and the class.26 In
contrast, clear sailing agreements typically arise in settlements
involving class relief that is either nonpecuniary," a claim-made fund
23. 475 U.S. 717, 737-38 (1986) (concluding that "it is not necessary to construe the
Fees Act as embodying a general rule prohibiting settlements conditioned on the waiver of
fees in order to be faithful to the purposes of that Act").
24. Id. at 736-37.
25. See id. at 725-26 & nn.10-l l (reversing holdings of Prandhi and an identical
ruling in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mendoza v. United States,
623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980)).
26. See, eg., InreGen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
E3d 768, 818-20 (3d Cir. 1995) (observing that "a defendant is interested only in disposing of
the total claim asserted against it; . . . the allocation between the class payment and the
attorneys' fees is of little or no interest to the defense" (alteration in original) (quoting
Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977)); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do
the Ments Matter? A Study of Settlements in Secunties Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497,
547 n.193 (1991) (noting that the amount of attorneys' fees in securities litigation typically
"makes no difference to the defendants since the fee comes out of the common fund").
27. See, e.g., Johnston v. Comerica Mortgage Corp., 83 F.3d 241, 242-43 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting a clear sailing agreement used in settlement of a class action involving $.68 in
monetary relief to each class member plus injunctive relief); BTZ, Inc. v. Great N. Nekoosa
Corp., 47 F3d 463, 465 (1st Cir. 1995) (reviewing a clear sailing agreement used in a
derivative class action where the alleged benefit to the shareholders was getting the
8 2 0 [ Vol . 77: 8 13
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subject to a reverter clause,2 or a cash settlement where a separate cash
payment for attorneys' fees is made directly from the defendant to the
lawyers representing the class."
In the later category dealing with separate cash payments, clear
sailing agreements appear to be a way for the plaintiff's attorney to
contract around the customary methods of calculating attorneys' fees
under the common-fund doctrine.30 However, cases involving
nonpecuniary relief or a reverter fund often provide a benefit to the
class that cannot be readily calculated. In addition, nonpecuniary
relief often lacks a liquid component that can be used to pay attorneys'
fees. Thus, a clear sailing agreement solves the liquidity problem and
allows the plaintiff's attorney and the defendant to ascertain their
respective benefits and liabilities before agreeing to terminate the
lawsuit. Not surprisingly, courts that have directly confronted clear
sailing agreements have speculated that such agreements may
ultimately be struck at the expense of the class. The more difficult
question is how to correct these incentives.
C Malchman v. Davis: Raising the Red Flag on Clear Sailing
Agreements
The origins of the heightened-scrutiny approach to clear sailing
agreements can be readily traced to Malchman v Davis, a 1985
decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
corporation to capitulate to a hostile takeover); In re Fleet/Norstar Secs. Litig., 935 F. Supp.
99, 112-17 (D.R.I. 1996) (examining a clear sailing agreement used in settlement of a
derivative class action lawsuit where the benefit to the class was improved corporate
procedures to eliminate possible misrepresentations).
28. See, e.g., Waters v. Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 190 E3d 1291, 1292 (11 th Cir.
1999) (reviewing a clear sailing agreement used in a reversionary fund settlement of a
commodities fraud class action); Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins., 989 F Supp. 375,
376-79 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting clear sailing agreement used to specify $39 million in
attorneys' fees when total relief to the class would depend on number of class members filing
claims under an ADR process, thus making total valuation of settlement speculative); Levit v.
Filmways, Inc., 620 E Supp. 421, 422 (D. Del. 1985) (examining a clear sailing agreement
used to specify $183,750 in attorneys' fees and the defendant retained reversionary interest in
the common fund, making the benefit to the class speculative).
29. See, e.g., Malchman v. Davis, 761 F2d 893, 905-06 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1985)
(discussing a fee arrangement where the majority of the fee was paid directly by the
defendant to the plaintiffs attorney). It should be noted that in Malchman it is plausible to
argue that the class component of the award was of less significance than the change in
business practices won by the settlement. Thus the clear sailing agreement was one way for
the plaintiffs attorney to calculate the combined benefit of the cash and nonpecuniary
components of the settlement.
30. See supra notes 9-10, 28-29 and accompanying text.
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Circuit that resulted in three divergent opinions." In Malchman, a
class action lawsuit was initiated against an insurance company that
allegedly committed fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in the sale and
administration of group health insurance policies. 32  The vehicle for
selling the disputed policies was an exclusive relationship between the
defendant and the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)."
In negotiating a settlement, the defendant agreed to terminate its
contractual relationship with the AARP, relinquish its control of
membership lists, and pay approximately $11 million to various
chapters of the AARP.4 Pursuant to a clear sailing provision, the
defendant also agreed not to contest a fee application of up to $2.35
million, of which the majority would be paid directly from the
defendant to the plaintiff's attorney." Remarkably, the settlement
included no relief for the AARP members who had actually purchased
the overpriced insurance policies.
Although the majority opinion expressed discomfort that fees and
merit relief appeared to have been negotiated simultaneously, the court
ultimately approved the settlement after modestly reducing attorneys'
fees to $1.9 million.3 ' However, in a vigorous dissent, Judge Mansfield
argued that the settlement had been seriously tainted by simultaneous
negotiations and pointed to numerous statements in the record that
strongly suggested that the issue of fees had been an integral part of
discussions at every phase of the negotiating process. 8  Moreover,
Judge Mansfield was incredulous that claims for individual damages,
potentially worth a total of $250 million before trebling, could be
31. 761 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1985).
32. Id. at 896.
33. Id. (describing the evolution of the lawsuit).
34. Id at 897 (describing terms of the settlement).
35. Id. at 905 n.6 (summarizing the mathematical formula whereby the defendant
agreed to pay ninety percent of all expenses and fees up to $1 million dollars and seventy
percent of the remainder up to $2.325 million, with the balance paid out of proceeds to the
AARP).
36. Id. at 902-03 (acknowledging that "[o]n first impression, chronology alone
suggests . . . little more than a trade of damages relief foreclosure for attorneys' fees" because
the other terms appeared to be part of an earlier voluntary agreement between the AARP and
the defendant insurance company). It is noteworthy that more than 3000 class members had
opted out prior to the Second Circuit's approval of the settlement. See id. at 902.
37. Id. at 906 & n.8 (reducing AARP portion of attorneys' fees from $425,700 to
$252,683 while upholding the $1.6 million payment from the defendant directly to class
counsel).
38. Id. at 910 & n.2, n.5 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (providing lengthy excerpt of
transcript recorded by state court referee where the attorneys for the defendant and the
plaintiff class acknowledged discussion of fees at several points prior to a settlement of the
merits).
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extinguished for a relatively modest payment to the AARP and a very
substantial payment to the lawyers representing the class.3 ' Finally, the
dissent expressed serious doubt in the propriety of approving a class
action settlement in which the representative plaintiffs were the brother
and mother-in-law of the legal counsel for the class.40
In a concurring opinion, Judge Newman objected to the
continued use of clear sailing agreements in class action settlements.4 1
According to Judge Newman, there is an important distinction
between a legitimate "ceiling" clause, which restricts the fee request of
plaintiff's counsel but permits a defendant to ascertain his maximum
liability, and a "clear sailing" clause, which restricts the defendant's
ability to object to exorbitant fees.42 In the latter category, Judge
Newman observed two potentially adverse effects. First, such an
agreement "deprives the trial court and a reviewing court of the
certainty of having the propriety of the fee request tested in the
adversary process." Second, it increases "the likelihood that
plaintiffs' counsel, in obtaining the defendant's agreement not to
challenge a fee request within a stated ceiling, will bargain away
something of value to the plaintiff class."44 Judge Newman went on to
argue that clear sailing agreements should be carefully scrutinized or
altogether forbidden in future cases.45 Yet, notwithstanding his strident
tone, he declined to object to its use on the facts of this case.46
D The 'Heightened-Scrutihy"Approach
In the aftermath of Malchman, courts have frequently relied on
Judge Newman's concurrence and its progeny to apply a heightened
level of scrutiny to class action settlements and fee petitions that utilize
clear sailing agreements.47 Although such an approach may have a
39. Id. at 909 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) ("This tantalizing prospect can tempt class
counsel, consciously or not, to agree to settlement terms that are less favorable to their clients
than would otherwise be the case.").
40. Id. at 912 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (commenting that surrounding circumstances
of the case suggest that the named plaintiffs would likely to be more inclined to "give up their
potential recoveries than would the other eleven million plus members of the class who have
no such relationships with class counsel").
41. Id. at 906-08 (Newman, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 907 (Newman, J., concurring).
43. Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 908 (Newman, J., concurring).
45. Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
46. See id. (Newman, J., concurring) (upholding the settlement because parties had
no prior reason to doubt the validity of the clear sailing agreement).
47. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524-25 (1st Cir.
1991) (citing the Newman concurrence and concluding that "heightened judicial oversight of
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strong theoretical appeal, its application typically results in either a
reduction in attorneys' fees48 or an approval of the fee request in total.49
Furthermore, a careful review of the case law found no reported cases
in which the alleged heightened level of scrutiny resulted in the
disapproval of the underlying settlement."o As a result, defendants who
enter into a clear sailing agreement can enjoy a high degree of
confidence that their total liability for damage relief and attorneys' fees
has been successfully capped.
Yet the primary flaw in the heightened-scrutiny approach is
perhaps most evident in Malchman itself. Although Judge Newman's
concurrence strongly criticized the potentially adverse effects of clear
sailing clauses, his vote simultaneously approved a settlement that had
clear record evidence of simultaneous negotiations occurring over a
prolonged period of time, the termination of claims totaling more than
this type of agreement [is] highly desirable"); I re Skinner Group, Inc., 206 B.R. 252, 262
n. 14 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (citing Newman concurrence and observing that "inclusion of such a
'clear sailing' provision . . . merely justifies the Court's application of heightened scrutiny
when evaluating the class counsel's ultimate fee request; it should not be read as an
independent ground for withholding approval of the entire settlement"); Levit v. Filmways,
Inc., 620 E Supp. 421, 423-24 (D. Del. 1985) (acknowledging the "inherent dangers" of a
clear sailing clause and extensively quoting Newman concurrence).
48. See BTZ, Inc. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 47 F.3d 463, 466-67 (1st Cir. 1995)
(affirming the lower court decision to deny attorneys' fees in a derivative class action because
class counsel failed to carry the burden that his efforts were the catalyst to the benefit that
accrued to the corporation); Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins., 989 F. Supp. 375, 380
(D. Mass. 1997) (provisionally upholding full attorneys' fees and releasing approximately
sixty percent immediately and the remainder on a staged basis according to the number of
claims processed against defendant); In re Fleet/Norstar Secs. Litig., 935 F. Supp. 99, 104,
116-17 (D.R.I. 1996) (denying a $499,000 fee request in a derivative class action because the
class counsel could show no credible causal link between his efforts and the benefit accruing
to the corporation); Levit, 620 E Supp. at 422, 427 (awarding $160,000 of a fee request of
$183,750 after conducting lodestar and percentage of the fund analysis).
49. See Waters v. Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999)
(upholding full attorneys' fees per the clear sailing agreement despite disagreement between
class counsel and defendant on its proper interpretation); Johnston v. Comerica Mortgage
Corp., 83 E3d 241, 247 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing a lower court decision that denied
attorneys' fees due to failure to submit time records and reasoning that class counsel had
relied on similar settlement agreements to justify fees in an earlier decision that was approved
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit).
50. More vigilant judicial supervision is the most common bromide for the numerous
agency problems that plague class action litigation. As Professor Coffee has observed,
"Although many reforms are possible and could succeed, only one is sure to fail: reliance on
trial court scrutiny of the settlement . . .. [S]uch a prescription of closer judicial involvement
seems likely only to preserve the status quo." John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action
Accountability: Reconcihng Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 370, 438 (2000) (footnote omitted). In the class action context, an
admonition for heightened judicial scrutiny is like dieting: a healthy and heartfelt aspiration
that seldom produces results.
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$250 million without any direct payment to the class, and named
plaintiffs who had a close familial relationship to class counsel, thus
casting serious doubt as to their objectivity and detachment." If Judge
Newman was concerned that clear sailing agreements pose the risk of
impermissible bargaining of merit relief for fees, it is hard to imagine a
more damning set of facts that would warrant judicial intervention.
III. SETTLEMENTS WITH CLEAR SAILING AGREEMENTS ARE MOST
LIKELY Too SMALL
Part III develops a theoretical framework for understanding the
settlement dilemma that clear sailing agreements are ultimately trying
to resolve, albeit sometimes at the expense of the class. Subpart A
discusses how such agreements can facilitate collusive settlements.
Subpart B argues that collusive settlements that systematically reduce
total defendant liability also undermine the important deterrence
function of class action lawsuits. Finally, subpart C concludes that the
heightened-scrutiny approach as it is currently applied cannot correct
the problem of underdeterrence.
A. Clear SailingAgreements and Collusive Settlements
Courts and commentators have long recognized the difficult
agency problems that plague class action settlements.52 However,
51. See supra notes 36-38, 42 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 (1999) (acknowledging
that the specter of "gigantic fees" may undermine arm's length bargaining); Brytus v. Sprang
& Co., 203 E3d 238, 249 (3d Cir. 2000) (Stapleton, J., dissenting) (observing that by
eliminating the risk of nonpayment, settlements can pose a "significant conflict of interest
between plaintiff class members and their counsel"); Third Circuit Report, suple note 9, at
266 ("Even if the plaintiff's attorney does not consciously or explicitly bargain for a higher
fee at the expense of the beneficiaries, it is very likely that this situation has indirect or
subliminal effects on the negotiations. And, in any event, there is an appearance of a conflict
of interest."); POSNER, supra note 6, at 627 (observing that "the lawyer for the class will be
tempted to offer to settle with the defendant for a small judgment and a large legal fee, and
such an offer will be attractive to the defendant, provided the sum of the two figures is less
than the defendant's net expected loss from going to trial" and noting that court approval of a
settlement may ultimately prove ineffectual because the collusive parties control information
necessary to evaluate the fairness of a settlement); Alexander, supra note 26, at 536 (noting
that class actions "are characterized by high agency costs: that is, a significant possibility
that litigation decisions will be made in accordance with the lawyer's economic interests
rather than those of the class"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement ofLaw Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 714 (1986) ("[P]laintiff's attorneys and the
defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs. At its worst,
the settlement process may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap settlement for a high
award of attorney's fees." (footnote omitted)).
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settlements that include clear sailing agreements often present
especially difficult problems for the supervisory court because they
frequently arise in cases where class relief is either nonpecuniary, and
therefore hard to measure, or indeterminate at the time of the Rule
23(e) fairness hearings due to a common fund that is subject to a
reversionary provision.13  In a typical common-fund class action,
attorneys' fees are usually based on the percentage of the fund
approach,"4 which uses the total relief available to the class as a
benchmark for calculating reasonable fees." However, in cases
involving nonpecuniary relief or a claims-made reverter provision, the
lack of a clearly definable or liquid common fund severely limits the
ability of class counsel to assess his expected payment, thus
complicating the decision whether to settle the lawsuit. Yet a clear
sailing agreement mitigates this problem by allowing the plaintiff's
attorney to present to the supervising court a package deal of merit
relief and fees that is willingly endorsed by the defendant. In short, the
primary function of the clear sailing agreement is to reduce the level of
uncertainty regarding fees to a point where the plaintiff's attorney can
confidently enter into a settlement.
Although the named plaintiff technically retains the right to direct
the litigation, numerous commentators have long accepted the reality
that the plaintiff's attorney is the real party in interest." When the
53. See supr notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
54. Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1268-71 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (requiring
the use of the percentage of the fund method); Camden I Condo. Ass'n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d
768, 774 (11th Cir. 1991) (requiring the use of percentage of the fund method); Rawlings v.
Prudential-Bache Props., 9 F.3d 513, 515-16 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing the "recent trend
towards adoption of a percentage of the fund method"); Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa, 925
F2d 518, 526 n.10 (1st Cir. 1991) (observing "the tendency exhibited by some courts,
particularly in common-fund cases, to jettison the lodestar in favor of a 'reasonable percent of
the fund' approach"); In re Am. Bank Note Holographics, Inc., 127 F Supp. 2d 418, 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (acknowledging "the trend of the district courts in this Circuit is to use the
percentage of the fund approach to calculate attorneys' fees"); In re Microstrategy, Inc., 172
F. Supp. 2d 778, 787 (ED. Va. 2001) (noting that "trend in securities class actions and other
common fund cases has been toward use of the percentage method"); see also Third Circuit
Report, supra note 9, at 254-58 (recommending that courts use exclusively the percentage of
the fund method, as opposed to the lodestar with risk multipliers, in cases involving a
common fund). But see Longden v. Sunderman, 979 E2d 1095, 1099 n.9 (5th Cir 1992)
(stating that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has yet to adopt the
percentage of fund approach in common-fund cases).
55. See, eg., Swedish Hosp. Corp., I F.3d at 1272 (observing that a "majority of
common-fund class action fee awards fall between twenty and thirty percent"); 3 FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 24.121, at 189 (1995) (discussing the
typical range between twenty-five to thirty percent and collecting examples).
56. Alexander, supra note 1, at 1520 (observing that "named plaintiffs are essentially
figureheads, merely the 'key to the courthouse door,'. . . who play no real role in directing the
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adversarial relationship is reconceptualized in this way, the important
elements of a successful settlement can be stated with a fair degree of
precision. The primary appeal of settlement for the defendant is the
ability to ascertain his or her full liability with certainty." For this very
reason, the United States Supreme Court overruled the ban on
simultaneous negotiations in civil rights cases, where attorneys' fees
are often a major component of total liability." In contrast, the class
counsel is seeking to maximize his total fees against the risk of
unsuccessful litigation and nonpayment. In a common-fund
settlement, the percentage of the fund approach yields a fairly
predictable range of fees. However, in hybrid common-fund cases in
which the total relief is either indeterminate or difficult to measure, the
total fee award is much more difficult to predict."
A clear sailing agreement partially offsets the risk of inadequate
attorneys' fees by ensuring that a fee request under a specified
maximum will not elicit any challenge from the defendant during the
Rule 23(e) fairness hearing. However, as Judge Newman correctly
observed, "[I]t is unlikely that a defendant will gratuitously accede to
the plaintiffs' request for a 'clear sailing' clause without obtaining
something in return. That something will normally be at the expense
of the plaintiff class.""o Because the heightened-scrutiny approach
litigation" (quoting Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972)); seealsoJonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorneyk Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3-6
(1991) (stating that "plaintiffs' class and derivative attorneys function essentially as
entrepreneurs who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary
control over all important decisions in the lawsuit" and therefore urging that the nominal
plaintiff requirement be eliminated). But cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)
(2002) (prohibiting a lawyer from considering his own interests, financial or otherwise, when
representing his client).
57. See Third Circuit Report, supra note 9, at 267 (noting that the ability to fix total
liability, including fees, is "the very certainty that makes settlement attractive to the
defendant").
58. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986). The Court noted:
The adverse impact of removing attorney's fees and costs from bargaining
might be tolerable if the uncertainty introduced into settlement negotiations were
small. But it is not. The defendants' potential liability for fees in this kind of
litigation can be as significant as, and sometimes even more significant than, their
potential liability on the merits.
Id For a discussion of the Prandinirule and its partial demise in Evans, see supra Part II.A.
59. This unpredictability can take several forms. For example, the court could find
an expert evaluation of a nonpecuniary settlement unpersuasive. Alternatively, the court may
eschew the common-fund approach altogether and perform a lodestar calculation without
also applying risk multipliers.
60. Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 908 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., concurring);
see also Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 E2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991) (cautioning
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often leads to a downward adjustment in attorneys' fees," experienced
counsel can partially compensate for this risk by moderately inflating
the ceiling figure specified in the clear sailing clause. Yet even in the
rare case where heightened scrutiny results in inadequate attorneys'
fees, approval of the underlying settlement permits the collusive
defendant to retain the benefit of his bargain. As a result, class action
settlements that are predicated on clear sailing agreements are likely to
produce class relief that is systematically too low.
B. The Need to Impose Full Liability in Order to Deter Wrongful
Conduct
One of the primary functions of the class action mechanism is the
private enforcement of laws.62 Although class actions directly
accomplish this goal by aggregating a multitude of relatively small
claims into one lawsuit, thus making it economically attractive to a
qualified attorney,63 private law enforcement is also enhanced when the
specter of a large class action judgment deters potential defendants
from engaging in wrongful conduct.64 As Judge Posner has observed,
"the most important point from an economic standpoint is that the
[class action defendant] be confronted with the costs of his violation-
this achieves the allocative purpose of the suit-not that he pays them
to his victims."" Therefore, when clear sailing agreements result in
that there is "a conflict inherent in cases like this one, where fees are paid by quondam
adversary from its own funds-the danger being that the lawyers might urge a class settlement
at a low figure or on a less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees").
61. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
62. See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for
Monitoring Class Action Lawyes, 21 REv. LITIG. 25, 26 (2002) (discussing the private law
enforcement function of class actions and noting that "class attorneys have made substantial
contributions to deterrence and compensation, supplementing the public sector in pursuit of
these goals"); Diane Wood Hutchinson, ClassActions: Joinder or Representational Device,
1983 Sup. CT. REv. 459, 480 (arguing that Supreme Court decisions on class actions evidence
two policies, "one favoring efficiency and economy of litigation, and one emphasizing the
role of the class action as a supplement to public law enforcement efforts").
63. SeeAmchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (discussing how class
actions make small claims economical to litigate).
64. POSNER, supra note 6, at 678 (commenting that "our legal system has long
accepted, if somewhat uneasily, the concept of the plaintiff's attorney as an entrepreneur who
performs the socially useful function of deterring undesirable conduct"); Kenneth W Dam,
Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 47, 54-56 (1975) (discussing deterrence as a goal of the class action device); see also
Miller & Singer, supra note 12, at 98 (explaining that "[i]f a company can anticipate
becoming a defendant in a class action lawsuit when it violates the rights of large numbers of
people, then it is less likely to engage in wrongful behavior").
65. POSNER, supra note 6, at 626-27.
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settlements that are systematically too low, the deterrence function of
class actions can be seriously compromised. As a result, all of society
is subject to higher levels of relatively minor but nonetheless wrongful
conduct by defendants.
C Problem of Clear SaiiingAgreements Cannot Be Corrected by
Judicial Oversight
There are at least two reasons why the problem of clear sailing
agreements and artificially low class action settlements cannot be
resolved by heightened judicial oversight. First, district courts lack
both the resources and the incentive to vigorously pursue plaintiffs'
interests in the face of a potentially collusive settlement. Judges who
approve a settlement remove a potentially complex and time-
consuming case from their docket, whereas a rejection of the
settlement may very well result in further litigation." Moreover,
approval of settlements is also favored by the ethos of the American
legal system, which strongly encourages the voluntary settlement of
legal claims, especially in the class action context." The favorable
reception given to most settlement proposals is perhaps best
summarized by a federal district court judge, who once quipped, "In
deciding whether to approve this settlement proposal, the court starts
from the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better
than a good trial."68
66. Professor Miller succinctly describes this dilemma:
[Judicial review of a settlement] is usually fairly ineffective at protecting
plaintiff interests. The settlement is presented to the judge with the enthusiastic
endorsement of the plaintiff's lawyer, the defendant's lawyer, and (in derivative
suits) the lawyer for the corporation. Often the only ones opposing the settlement
are private individuals whose arguments may be unsophisticated or frivolous.
Moreover, the trial judge knows that if he or she approves the settlement there is
little likelihood that the decision will be appealed, whereas if he or she rejects it
there is certain to be an appeal. If the judge approves the settlement, the case will
be removed from the docket, whereas if he or she rejects the settlement the case
will continue to clog the docket and may even eventuate in a trial.
Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 214 n.73
(1987); see also Macey & Miller, supm note 56, at 45-46 (discussing reluctance of courts to
reject settlements).
67. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 E2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) (commenting that "[a]ll the dynamics conduce to judicial approval of such
settlements" once the parties have come to an agreement); Edward Labaton, Class Action
Settlements, rn 2 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SECURITIES LITIGATION 1993: CURRENT
STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPMENTS 351, 353-54 (1993) (discussing the favorable judicial
attitude toward class action settlements and collecting cases on this issue).
68. In re Warner Communications Sees. Litig., 618 E Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y
1985), aff'd, 798 E2d (2d Cir. 1986).
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A second reason why the heightened-scrutiny approach is an
inadequate response to clear sailing agreements is the strong
possibility that the underlying settlement agreement is the product of
tainted negotiations. Although a court may be confident that it can
police unethical conduct through a reduction in attorneys' fees, such an
approach leaves intact a settlement that systematically favors
defendants at the expense of the class. An optimal solution to the
problem of clear sailing agreements would permit defendants to
ascertain their total liability in a settlement agreement while also
providing plaintiff's counsel with a reliable mechanism for securing
adequate fees. A proposed structural remedy to this incentive problem
is discussed in Part IV
IV PROPOSED SOLUTION THAT ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR CLEAR
SAILING AGREEMENTS
The solution proposed by this Article is straightforward. First,
courts should adopt a per se ban on all class actions settlements that
have utilized a clear sailing provision. Cases that formerly would have
utilized a clear sailing agreement can be distinguished from typical
common-fund cases by their reliance on nonpecuniary relief or a
claims-made common fund with a reversionary provision. The
hallmark of these cases is that the liability of the defendant is not fixed
by a cash payment (or a series of cash payments). Because the process
of calculating attorneys' fees inevitably requires that the settlement be
given a discrete dollar value, these cases will often create novel
valuation problems. Unfortunately, both the defendant and the class
counsel advance their own interests by supplying the court with
estimates that are exaggerated or overly optimistic."
In the event the settling parties propose a settlement that cannot
be readily reduced to a fixed dollar value, the supervising court should
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the class on the issue of
attorneys' fees." Although the plaintiff's counsel will need to negotiate
69. See Klement, supra note 62, at 42-43 (discussing the types of settlements that
present difficult valuation problems and thus opportunities for settlements that "would
increase the lawyer's fee with no accompanying benefit to the class").
70. This reform has been proposed by Professors Macey and Miller in the fee-setting
context, see Macey & Miller, supra note 56, at 47-48, and by another commentator in the
settlement context generally, see Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action
Settlements: The Need for a Guardian Durng Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 308, 325-32 (1985). In contrast, this proposal is limited to settlements involving
nonpecuniary or claims-made reversionary funds. In these types of cases, courts are often
faced with difficult valuation issues, which is a settlement form that is conducive to collusion,
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a settlement that has sufficient liquidity to eventually pay reasonable
attorneys' fees, this sum will be presumed to be part of the common
benefit accruing to the class." After an adversarial proceeding to
determine the merits of the fee petition, the plaintiff's attorney would
receive compensation that is commensurate with the benefit conferred
upon the class. In turn, the common fund would be modestly taxed to
pay the fee of the guardian adlitem.72
A. Rule 23(e): Distict Courts Should NotApprove Settlements
with Clear SailingAgreements
The first step in implementing this solution is for courts
(preferably federal appellate courts) to abandon the heightened-
scrutiny approach and adopt a per se rule against the use of clear
sailing agreements in class action settlements. The primary virtue of
this approach is that it addresses the serious risk that a clear sailing
provision may be obtained only at the expense of the class." Although
such an approach might, at first glance, appear to frustrate the policy
objective of encouraging settlements,74 the importance of attorneys'
fees within the class action bar ensures that the expectations of
practicing attorneys will quickly adjust to a different set of ground
rules. Assuming that a defendant can limit his liability to an amount
lower than his expected cost at trial" and the plaintiff's attorney can
and a lack of adversarial proceeding due to the high likelihood that such a settlement includes
a clear sailing agreement. In this author's opinion, appointing a guardian as a matter of
course would not be necessary insofar as the incentives of the plaintiff's attorney align with
the class.
71. Cf DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION § 30.42, at
239-40 (3d ed. 2003). According to Herr:
If an agreement is reached on the amount of a settlement fund and separately
providing an amount of attorney's fees and expenses, both amounts should be
disclosed to the class. Moreover, the sum of the two amounts ordinarily should be
treated as a settlement fund for the benefit of the class, with the agreed-on fee
amount constituting the upper limit of the fees that can be awarded to counsel.
Id.
72. See, e.g., In re Fleet/Norstar Secs. Litig., 935 F. Supp. 99, 110 (D.R.I. 1996)
(relying on the guardian ad/item report to reduce attorneys' fees by more than $600,000 and
using $25,000 of this savings to pay the guardian).
73. See Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 908 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (observing that clear sailing agreements increase "the likelihood that plaintiffs'
counsel . . . will bargain away something of value to the plaintiff class").
74. See supm notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
75. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 626-27 (discussing the calculus made by the
defendant).
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predict his fees with a fair degree of certainty, negotiated settlements
will result.
The proposed ban would most likely have its greatest effect on
settlements that present difficult valuation problems, such as coupons
or reverter funds. This result follows from the fact that clear sailing
agreements are necessary to reduce the uncertainty for plaintiffs'
attorneys on the issue of fees. Insofar as these types of agreements
would have formerly served as a vehicle for collusive settlements,
permitting a defendant to terminate the class action at a low price in
exchange for excessive attorneys' fees (and silence on this issue at the
Rule 23(e) fairness hearing), we might expect litigants to return to a
cash-based settlement. Based on the extensive criticism levied against
nonpecuniary relief, this might, in fact, be a good result." On the other
hand, there could very well be instances where nonpecuniary or
reverter provisions offer class members the most satisfactory form of
relief. For example, rather than a nominal sum of cash, class members
may get more economic value out of coupons that offer steep
discounts for a product that they need anyway (e.g., shampoo)."
Moreover, defendants may be willing to offer a significantly higher
value in nonpecuniary relief in order for the opportunity to retain the
class member as a customer."
Under the proposed ban, nonpecuniary or reverter-fund relief
would still be possible. However, the rule would likely filter out
collusive settlements because the plaintiff's attorney would have less
confidence that the exaggerated benefit to the class would survive the
76. See, eg., Miller & Singer, supra note 12, at 107-12 (discussing criticisms of
nonpecuniary relief, including serious valuation problems that permit lawyers to exaggerate
the benefit conferred on the class and thus obtain a larger fee and commenting on the strong
defendant preference for nonpecuniary relief, which can be leveraged against the plaintiffs'
attorney in a "reverse auction", where defendants have several parallel cases occurring in
different jurisdictions and award the settlement to the attorney who makes the lowest bid);
Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARv. L. REv 810, 811 (1996) (arguing that
valuation problems inherent in in-kind compensation "create[s] a troubling situation in which
reviewing courts must act as blindfolded fiduciaries").
77. See Miller & Singer, supra note 12, at 112-18 (discussing several examples,
including coupons for shampoo, where consumer welfare is enhanced by nonpecuniary
relief); see also Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, 546 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Ohio
1982) (approving a class action settlement involving coupons redeemable for groceries).
78. See, e.g., In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 164 F Supp. 2d 1002, 1118-19 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (accepting expert testimony that "a well-designed coupon settlement can provide
class members with more value than a cash settlement because the defendant is likely to be
more generous in its coupon offer" and that "coupons may maintain or enhance existing
customer relationships" (internal quotations omitted)); Gutterman v. Am. Airlines, No. 95 CH
982 (li1. Cir. Ct. Cook County 1995) (offering discount of airline tickets or bonus frequent
flier miles for class members in dispute over miscalculated frequent flier miles).
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adversarial process against the guardian ad litem.79 In short, the
optimal rate and value of settlements could theoretically be achieved
by replacing a clear sailing agreement with nontraditional class action
relief that confers a real and substantial benefit on the class. The next
section briefly outlines idiosyncratic features of nonpecuniary and
reverter-fund relief that would need to be considered in structuring a
socially efficient settlement."o
B. Defendant and Class Counsel Should Negotiate Only a
Settlement for the Class
After courts implement a per se ban against clear sailing
agreements, a plaintiff attorney's best strategy for obtaining a high rate
of return on a pending class action is to seek cost-effective ways to
maximize the value of any future judgment or settlement. As
discussed earlier, clear sailing agreements are largely superfluous to
common-fund cases that result in a single lump-sum cash payment.'
Therefore, in order to mimic these incentives in class actions involving
nonpecuniary or indeterminate relief, it is important for the
supervising court to clarify that all relief under the settlement
presumptively belongs to the class until a second phase of the
settlement process is convened to determine an award of attorneys'
fees. Similar to a traditional common fund, the settlement should be
conceptualized as a benefit conferred upon the class.82
In order to safeguard appropriate levels of liability for defendants
while also providing adequate financial incentives to plaintiffs'
attorneys, it is necessary to consider how settlements will be structured
79. In re Fleet/Norstar Sees. Litig., 936 F. Supp. 99 (D.R.I. 1996), provides a good
example of how the appointment of a guardian ad litem can alter the settlement calculus.
Recognizing that "the very existence of a clear sailing agreement increases the likelihood that
something of value will have been bargained away by counsel," the court appointed a
guardian ad litem to prepare a report on the application for attorneys' fees. Id at 104-05.
The guardian's report documented a large number of errors, overcharges, and duplication of
efforts, which in turn persuaded the court to reduce the total fee award. Id at I 10. Moreover,
the court adopted the guardian's recommendation that class counsel should receive no
compensation for settlement of a companion shareholder derivative lawsuit. Id. at 112-17. In
addition to the possibility of a lower fee, fee proceedings expose a plaintiffs' attorney to
possible reputation damage.
80. When competent and faithful agents negotiate a class action settlement, this
Article asserts that their work product is both socially optimal and efficient. A settlement that
is commensurate with the loss suffered by the plaintiff class, adjusted for the likelihood of
prevailing in litigation, has the ameliorative effect of making wrongful conduct more
expensive in the first instance; optimal deterrence, in turn, increases social wealth.
81. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
82. For background on the equitable common-fund doctrine, see note 27.
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in two contexts that normally give rise to clear sailing agreements:
(1) settlements involving nonpecuniary relief and (2) common funds
subject to a reversionary interest.
1. Settlements with Nonpecuniary Compensation
One problem posed by class action settlements that involve
nonpecuniary relief is that they often lack liquidity, thus making it
virtually impossible to apply the percentage of the fund method to
determine and pay attorneys' fees." Therefore, this Article proposes
that the attorney for the class negotiate a common fund that would be
composed of both nonpecuniary relief (e.g., coupons for shampoo) and
a cash component that would approximate the payout under the
percentage of the fund approach. Under the current law, nonpecuniary
relief often poses notoriously difficult valuation problems for courts,
primarily because both the defendant and the plaintiff's attorneys have
a strong incentive to exaggerate its value to the court.84
However, the inclusion of the guardian ad litem provision could
act as a check against an overly generous representation to the court
during the class relief phase of the settlement. Assuming the plaintiff's
attorney has vigorously pursued maximum relief for the class, the
plaintiff's attorney will have ample evidence to prevail in an
adversarial setting, thus justifying an award of attorneys' fees for the
full monetary component included in the common fund. Moreover, a
higher settlement is likely to be extracted from the defendant, which
enhances the deterrent value (at least marginally) of the class action
device.
83. For a discussion of the percentage of the common-fund approach, see notes 49-
50.
84. The defendant wants to extinguish pending claims at a low actual cost, and the
class attorney wants the perception of a large settlement in order to justify a high fee award.
See Miller & Singer, supra note 12, at 112; see also POSNER, supra note 6, at 627 (noting
generally the problem of reviewing the adequacy of a class action settlement because "the
lawyers largely control his access to the information-about the merits of the claim, . . . the
likely damages if the case goes to trial, etc.-that is vital to determining the reasonableness of
the settlement."). It should be noted, however, that a court sometimes uncritically accepts the
litigants' valuation, glossing over the potential that a cash equivalent would have a
significantly lower value. See, e.g., Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., 91 F Supp. 2d 942, 975-
76 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (accepting, uncritically, the face value of coupons for new Toshiba
products as part of a class action settlement allegedly worth $2.1 billion).
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2. Settlements Where Funds Revert to the Defendant
Serious valuation problems are also present in a claims-made
common fund where residual funds revert back to the defendant. In
these cases, a court reviewing a proposed settlement faces the dilemma
of using the available fund as the benchmark for attorneys' fees when
the total funds actually claimed, perhaps due to the administrative costs
confronted by class members who attempt to access their relatively
minor relief, may be only a fraction of this larger amount." For
example, in Waters v International Precious Metals, the defendant and
the plaintiff's attorney successfully negotiated a $40 million settlement
in a class action involving fraud in the sale of commodity futures."6
Class counsel then petitioned the court for a fee award of thirty-three
and one third percent, which the defendant did not oppose pursuant to
a clear sailing agreement." However, shortly after the court awarded
the full $13.33 million in fees, the defendant appealed the propriety of
the award because the class had only claimed $6.5 million of the
common fund." Remarkably, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this judgment under the abuse of
discretion standard."
In a short memorandum opinion in which the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, Justice O'Connor expressed dismay at the
disproportionately large attorneys' fees but declined to support a full
review by the Court.' Nevertheless, because the defendant had waived
his right to contest attorneys' fees under a clear sailing agreement,
Justice O'Connor observed that "this particular case does not present a
suitable opportunity for its resolution."" Under the analysis offered in
this Article, it is important to recognize that it would be relatively rare
for a plaintiff's attorney to agree to a reverter-fund settlement without
also having the security of a clear sailing agreement to reduce the
uncertainty in his fee award." Ironically, the Court's denial of
85. See Klement, supr note 62, at 43 (observing that "imposition of difficult-to-
satisfy conditions on class action members who wish to collect their share" may inflate the
perceived value of the settlement).
86. 190 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999).
87. Id. at 1292-93.
88. Id. at 1293-95 & n.6. The balance of approximately $21 million reverted to the
defendant, making more than half of the $40 million settlement an illusory benefit to the
class.
89. Id. at 1300.
90. See Int'l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1224-25 (2000)
(mem.).
91. Id. at 1224.
92. See supra Part III.A.
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certiorari suggests that freedom of contract between the plaintiff's
attorney and the defendant may ultimately pose a barrier to courts that
attempt to remedy agency problems inherent in class action
settlements.
One way that courts have mitigated the potential for collusive
settlements in reverter-fund cases is to stage the payment of attorneys'
fees in accordance with payouts made under the claims process."
Although the law is currently unclear on whether the Supreme Court's
holding in Boeing Co. v Van GemerP requires that attorneys' fees be
calculated according to the total fund available for relief rather than the
actual payout," the ability to award attorneys' fees according to actual
(rather than projected) class relief gives the courts a tremendous tool
for eliciting accurate information from the plaintiff's attorney during
the merit relief phase of the settlement process.
It is important to emphasize that the issue of attorneys' fees
would not be a necessary component of the initial settlement between
the defendant and plaintiff's attorney. Rather, the parties could make
projections on the number of claims that will be made during the
recovery period. Then, during the fee-award phase of the settlement
process, the court could use an adversarial process with the guardian
ad i/temn to determine total attorneys' fees under the common-fund
doctrine; a subsidiary but important issue would be the extent to which
attorneys' fees will be staged according to claims experience.
Assuming the plaintiffs' attorney vigorously negotiated a settlement
against the defendant and minimized administrative obstacles that
would obstruct the members of the class from accessing their relief,
the plaintiffs' attorney will have a cogent explanation for the residual
uncertainty in the total settlement value and a strong case for the
immediate payment of most or all of its fees.
93. See, eg., Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins., 989 F Supp. 375, 378-80 (D.
Mass. 1997) (staging a payout of approximately one-half of attorneys' fees in order to ensure
that the class counsel monitors the claims process and effectuates maximum class relief); see
also Strong v. BellSouth Telecomm., 137 F.3d 844, 852-53 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion basing attorneys' fees on the actual payout rather
than the size of fund available for relief).
94. 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
95. See, e.g., Petruzzi's, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 983 F Supp. 595, 604-05
(M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that under Boeing, a common fund held in escrow for the class
requires that courts ignore the actual payout when determining attorneys' fees, while a
contractual duty to make payouts directly to plaintiffs during the claims process permits a
staged award of attorneys' fees commensurate with actual payout); see also Int'l Precious
Metals, 530 U.S. at 1224 (noting the split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.on whether
attorneys' fees in reversionary funds can be calibrated to the actual payout).
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C Appointing a Guardian Ad Litem to Represent the Class When
DetermhningAttorneys'Fees
The lynchpin of the proposal presented in this Article is the
appointment, as a matter of course, of a guardian ad litem in all class
action settlements that include nonpecuniary relief or a common fund
subject to a reversionary interest. A district court's supervisory power
under Rule 23 is a sufficient basis to ground such a rule. Moreover, its
adoption can be clearly signaled to the local bar through its acceptance
as a local court rule.
Although the guardian would not be appointed until the
settlement on the merits relief has been provisionally approved, the
specter of a court-appointed advocate challenging the attorneys' fee
petition will most likely have a significant impact on bargaining
dynamics and trade-offs proposed by the defendant and class counsel.
Collusion on the part of the plaintiffs' attorney could potentially
jeopardize his or her final payment. As one court described this
option, "The rationale for appointing a guardian ad litem in the fee
award proceeding following the settlement of a case ... is that the
guardian fulfills the advocate's role abandoned by the defendant [after
extinguishing all claims through a common-fund settlement].""
Because this proposal restores the adversarial process to the
determination of attorneys' fees, the trade-off between fees and merit
relief will be much less likely to occur."
V CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a solution to the long-standing concern by
courts that clear sailing agreements may ultimately serve as a vehicle
for collusive settlements. By reviewing the existing case law and
clarifying that clear sailing agreements are most prevalent in cases
involving either nonpecuniary relief or a common fund with a
reversionary interest, this Article sets forth a useful framework for
96. Gottlieb v. Barry, 43 F3d 474, 490 (10th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging arguments
for a guardian adlitem, but denying such an appointment as a matter of right).
97. Compar In re Fleet/Norstar Secs. Litig., 935 F. Supp. 99, 104-05 (D.R.I. 1996)
(appointing a guardian aditembecause the "absence of adversity makes judicial oversight of
both of these fee agreements highly desirable, especially since the very existence of a clear
sailing agreement increases the likelihood that something of value has been bargained away
by counsel"), with Malchman v. Davis, 761 E2d 893, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the use of clear sailing agreements because they deny the scrutiny of
the adversarial process to the setting of attorneys' fees and make a trade-off between merit
relief and fees significantly more likely to occur but nonetheless voting to approve a
settlement arising in that very context).
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understanding the difficult incentive problems faced by both litigants
and courts. The solution of a two-phase adversarial process, the first
between the plaintiffs' attorney and the defendant and the second
between the plaintiffs' attorney and a guardian ad litem, offers a
reasonable opportunity for courts to preempt collusive settlements and
ultimately preserve the deterrence function of the class action device.
